Abstract: Science parks have long been in fashion, originally in the US, then in Europe, and now in the rest of the world. They promise much in terms of growth and employment achieved through providing new, high technology companies with an ideal location. Clustered in pleasant surroundings alongside a university or research centre, entrepreneurs are able to transform their ideas into innovations. Yet, despite all the enthusiasm, there is little evidence that science parks work as their supporters say, and growing evidence that they do not. There may be benefits, but perhaps for those who can lay claim to a role in a particular model of innovation, rather than for the firms that occupy the science parks. This paper considers the creation of the Silicon Valley model, and then speculates on the implications for China of its uncritical acceptance in science parks.
Introduction
It would be extraordinary indeed were China not enthusiastic about science parks. The rest of the world is enthusiastic and there is no reason why China should be an exception. More rationally, the science park promises so much, so many benefits for so few costs, and so quickly, that not to be enthusiastic would seem quite irresponsible.
And yet, while a few science parks have proved to be enormously successful, many more have not. Why, then, should the exceptional be seen as typical, even inevitable?
Is this merely the triumph of hope over experience, or is something more complicated at work? We argue here that blind optimism is not a convincing explanation and that the complex alternative is both more satisfactory and more intriguing. It reveals much about contemporary attitudes towards technology and development, attitudes that are often no more questioned than the science parks these attitudes support.
But first the paper will tackle the prosaic: just what are science parks? It will then turn to the available evidence for their performance. The next section explains reaction to this evidence in terms of the rationale behind science parks, and this is really the core of the paper's argument. The beliefs that underlie so much of the rationale make actual performance, however measured and however miserable, largely irrelevant. The science park is perhaps best understood as an article of faith, and it does not do to question faith with statistics and logic. The presence of science parks can be taken as an indicator of prevalent beliefs about technology and innovation, and about how the world should be ordered. And where there are beliefs, there is always the danger that the more fervent belief may exploit the less. This is a much more adventurous approach than trying to determine whether science parks are good or bad, and it is the approach we will take to our consideration of science parks in China.
The science park
The harder one strives to define a science park, the more one appreciates the advantages of imprecision. The term seems to be generally synonymous with technology park, and with science and technology park, with research park and innovation park, innovation centre, science and technology centre, and sometimes even with science city and technopole. A science park can be virtually anything, and many are little more that very ordinary property developments seeking to cash in on the cachet. That there should be a cachet at all is a primary concern of this paper and will be considered later. So, too, will the curious disposition to look down on the entrepreneurialism of property developers who create science parks while admiring that of the scientists and engineers who occupy them: clearly, entrepreneurialism in itself is not admirable [1] , and may actually be disruptive in the highly-regulated environment of the science park [2] .
Very frequently, science parks are described in terms of what they are not rather than what they are: they are not the dirty, polluted sites of old, rustbelt manufacturing.
They are not bad, so they must be good. The definition adopted by the International Association of Science Parks is that originally formulated by the UK Science Park Association. A science park is:
"an initiative for the establishment and growth of technology-based enterprise formally and operationally linked to at least one centre of technical expertise an organization which provides management support for its tenant companies." [3] Despite the generous variety of definitions, it is still possible to reach some sort of consensus over what a science park is. Just what the science park is supposed to do is more elusive. It is, of course, necessary to determine this before there can be any assessment of whether science parks succeed in what they do. Massey and Wield have analysed the many purposes of UK science parks [4] . They would seem to have four in common:
• to create employment
• to establish new firms
• to facilitate the link between universities and these firms
• to encourage high technology.
Success or failure?
Judged by the Massey and Wield criteria, it would seem that many science parks fail.
Most do not stimulate high technology firms and high technology employment. The mere presence of such firms on science parks is often taken as proof positive of the success of these parks. Yet, it is clearly misguided to suggest that these firms would not have existed without the science park, that they could not possibly have located elsewhere. What evidence there is does not conclude that science parks offer the optimum location for high technology firms. Indeed, it would seem that the science park offers little advantage at all.
Westhead and Batstone compare the location decisions of high technology firms on and off science parks [5] . The criteria of the two groups differ little and are soberingly prosaic, the location generally being chosen because the founder lived nearby or because the firm was already based locally. Convenient car parking was among the most important considerations for both groups, and the second most important of all for those on science parks. Most important was the prestige the science park offered. Mystique commands a premium. But precisely because the science park does bestow status, it may actually intrude between the park's high technology entrepreneurs and the world outside. For decades now, it has been appreciated that innovation requires the integration of research with manufacturing, of science with production, of both research and production with customers and suppliers, of the highly qualified with the highly experienced. The science park can make more difficult all these forms of integration [6] , isolating its firms in high technology enclaves [7] .
Lofsten and Lindelof also compare the performance of firms on and off science parks, this time Swedish firms [8] . Again, there is not much in it: firms on science parks grow faster in terms of employment and sales, firms off-park grow more rapidly in terms of profitability. UK evidence suggests no difference in survival rates, R&D performance, and employment growth between firms on and off parks, or in much else [9] .
"The existing evidence suggests that the 'returns' to location on an [sic] UK science park are negligible." [10] Massey and Wield find that most employment on science parks has simply moved from somewhere else nearby [11] . And while a quarter of science park firms were indeed start-ups, most of these had been started by government or institutions rather than by entrepreneurs. Links with universities were few, much technology was not leading edge, and innovation tended to be incremental rather than radical.
Vedovello, and many others, find the science park location gives little advantage to the firm except in general terms of environment [12] . Access to university resources, including information, is not important. Links do develop with university academics and seem to contribute to the survival of firms, but they are generally informal links only marginally closer than those of firms not located on the science park [13] . The survey evidence indicates that firms on science parks are not more innovative than firms located elsewhere, nor do they spend more on R&D [14] .
Why the enthusiasm?
It is now two decades since one US survey roundly declared that "well over 50 percent of science and high technology parks have failed" [15] . Why, then, is the belief that science parks are key to the growth of high technology firms quite so general, and so fervently held? There would seem to be several strands to the explanation. One is the celebrity status that is accorded a very few, very successful science parks, such as the one at Cambridge [16] . These few have been elevated to such prominence that it is easy to forget that they really are quite exceptional. County, New York -parks which have not been successful in attracting significant research activity." [17] It may be altogether naïve to assume that science parks can succeed only by doing what they are supposed to do. It may be that the very existence of a science park is itself success for a regional authority anxious to show that it is promoting economic development, or for a university demonstrating that it has come down from its ivory tower, or for a small firm trying to market a new product as high technology.
We argue here that, while the benefits of science parks are widely touted [18] , it is not essential that the benefits claimed are ever realized. What is important, and what is the primary function of science parks, is their ability to accommodate, propagate and promulgate a view of technology and innovation that is to the advantage of many of the parties involved in science parks [19] Consider the basic model that underlies the idea of the science park: it is that knowledge lies within the science and engineering departments of universities and similar institutions of learning, knowledge that can be exploited by firms to innovate and create wealth. If only this information could be transferred to these firms. This is a linear model in which innovation is seen to have its origins in basic research, or science, or invention -some activity at the beginning of a process. Innovation is perceived as the culmination of this process, and so those who initiate or control the process have power over innovation. Such a model is obviously attractive to universities, and especially to scientists and engineers, because it accords them a primary role in wealth creation. When knowledge is no longer regarded as a form of wealth, and the scholar is judged by his entrepreneurial credentials, such a role is important [20] . The model is also attractive to politicians and public servants because it affords them a role in arranging the transfer of technology. And it is attractive to managers, who need to think of innovation as a process so that it may be managed, and managed by method. The science park concept reinforces the forces of order in the constant battle against chaos. Social systems are seen to depend on system and to be threatened by innovation that is not properly channeled. There is no place for happenstance, serendipity, and chance in such innovation, for anything other than scientific rigour and managed process. The science park fits this model well, and is vigorously defended by those for whom the model is indispensable.
The Silicon Valley model
Technology -basically how things are done [21] -is not always prominent among the factors of production. It rises to the fore during times of change and uncertainty, basically when there is pressure to do things in other ways. The Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions of Western Europe are obvious examples, but consider instead the problem of poor productivity in the US in the late 1970s, a problem addressed rather than solved by the application of new information and communications technology [22] . In this case, the technological solution was considered to lie not in incremental improvement to mechanization or factory organization, but in radically new technology -high technology. In as much as the term has any precise meaning [23] , it is a type of technology to which science is considered to make a major contribution. High technology is the technology of science parks.
In the early 1980s, the United States imposed export controls to prevent high technology information leaving the West [24] . The loss of this information to the Communist bloc, it was argued, would reduce the technology gap with the West and hence imperil US national security. In fact, the real threat to national security was commercial rather than military, posed by the growing technological strength of the Japanese and even the Europeans -and perhaps now the Chinese. "In the 1980s, the enemy was Japan: now it is China." [25] Perceived technological threat encouraged the United States to look more and more to high technology for the competitiveness it sought, and to a model that would encompass these requirements. Silicon Valley led the world in microelectronics, rapidly becoming the technology fundamental to all methods of production and to many products. It seemed to follow that whatever Those responsible for science parks often went to extraordinary lengths to replicate precisely the trappings of the real Silicon Valley. The manicured lawns, the trim trails, model was valid. The cynical might see convenience and self-interest in this conviction, but this would be to overlook the power of myth. A myth is akin to religious faith in that it is dependent on belief. Whether myth is right or wrong is irrelevant and so questioning myth is always pointless [32] . The Silicon Valley model acquired mythic status in the 1980s in that what was expected of it was momentous and the means by which it would be achieved magical. Ironically, the very foreign competition that found the myth so attractive was undermining the comparative advantage of Silicon Valley in high technology [33] . The myth flourished while the reality floundered. And because the Silicon Valley myth was detached from reality, it was unscathed by revelations that uncertain water and electricity supplies, smog, overcrowding, traffic congestion, chemical pollution, poverty and social exclusion were the lot of many of the Valley's high technology workers [34] . Indeed, high technology seemed to be most prosperous in those parts of Silicon Valley outstanding for their high pollution, high housing costs and shortage of cultural amenities [35] .
Re-interpreting reality
The innovation of high technology, the innovation fundamental to increased competitiveness and wealth, is as much the product of serendipity as of system. What those who seek to replicate Silicon Valley seem to forget is that neither it nor that other primary centre of high technology enterprise, Route 128 around Boston, was planned. Just as the uncertainty of innovation has been re-interpreted, so has the reality of Silicon Valley. Whatever made Silicon Valley, it was not Stanford University. Geographical proximity is not a sufficient condition for contact and network dynamics, especially when it is regulated by an institution.
The successor to Silicon Valley is not the science park, but such concentrations of economic activity as the motor racing firms of South East England.
"… Motor Sport Valley shows few overt signs of institutional thickness in the form of 'financial institutions, local chambers of commerce, training agencies, clerical bodies, unions, government agencies providing premises, land and infrastructure, business service organizations, marketing boards and so on'." [44] No matter how unofficial and impromptu such concentrations of economic activity, there is always a temptation to present them as planned. To this, the multitude of Silicon Glens, Corridors, Gulches, Cities, Bayous, Freeways, Alleys, Fens and Bogs around the world are eloquent testimony.
Science parks in China
The first Chinese science park, and now the largest, was launched in 1988 at Zhongguancun, within the Beijing Experimental Zone. As ever, Silicon Valley was the guide:
"Since the first science park was created on the campus of Stanford University more than 40 years ago, Science Parks have been founded in many parts of the world. … Zhongguancun is the name of a place in the Haidan District, northwest of Beijing, but currently the name connotes a high-tech Science Park similar to the Silicon Valley in the US." [45] Even the United States Embassy in Beijing describes Zhongguancun science park as "a large-scale attempt to recreate Silicon Valley in China" [46] . By 1995, there were 52 Chinese national science parks, and another 31 regional innovation centers [47] . There are now 53 national science parks, and more than 50 "Any visitor to the Technology Parks in Wuxi, Changzhou, Nanjing or Suzhou will be told about 'Mr Nigel' and, as part of the three-year programme, a series of training programmes for Science Park managers has been started." [48] The Annual Report of the Chinese Torch Program for 1999 claims that there were 2.21 million people working in 17,498 high technology firms on the 53 national science parks. Of these, 670,000 were researchers and engineers, 5,300 with Ph.D.s and 38,000 with masters degrees. The annual value of goods and services produced on these science parks was nearly 600 billion RMB, and the export income about $US12 billion.
Amidst several developments in Shanghai that might be termed science parks are the Shanghai-Caohejing Hi-Tech Park, close to Hongqiao Airport, and Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park in Pudong. The former was founded in 1988, the latter in 1992.
Zhangjiang is absolutely vast, covering over 500 square kilometers in total. The purpose of these parks is quite simply to "attract high tech manufacturing firms for the purpose of jump-starting economic development" [49] . There is very little criticism of science parks in China. It is widely accepted that they do whatever it is they should do, but there is little consideration of just what that might be and just how it is to be achieved.
While assessing the success of science parks in China meets the same obstacles as the exercise encounters elsewhere, it may be worth considering Chinese science parks in the light of what has been uncovered in other parts of the world. After all, the stimulus for Chinese science parks came from those very parts of the world that now seem to be experiencing some trouble with their science parks. Table 1 compares the activities of high technology companies on and off six Shanghai science parks in 1999.
It would seem that such firms fare little better on science parks than they do off science parks. The value of production per firm is about the same, as is export income.
The only real difference is that high technology firms off science parks are considerably bigger. It is possible to conduct a similar exercise for high technology firms nationally in the same year. The result is presented in Table 2 . The national picture resembles the Shanghai situation in that high technology firms are considerably bigger off science parks than on. This is, perhaps, to be expected if science parks are nurturing small firms. What requires more explanation, though, is just why the off-park firms are so very much more economically active, and so much more profitable, than their counterparts on science parks. It may be that the available data are unreliable and misleading, but it seems worth noting the similarity between these findings and those that have emerged elsewhere. 
Concluding thoughts
The assumption supporting science parks is wrong. The mythic status of the model underlying this assumption protects it from critical assessment. Myth allows nonsense to pass unchallenged.
"The research findings from UK science parks, together with the discussion of current understanding of the innovation process, suggests that the science park concept is fundamentally flawed in its premise that universities and polytechnics are reservoirs of knowledge to be tapped merely by siting property developments nearby." [50] This is not to say that science parks bring no benefits. They do; they bring benefits to property developers, to the host institutions, the vice-chancellors, to the scientists and engineers who are shown to play a seminal part in innovation; benefits to those who need a handy tool for regional development; and benefits to those who are pleased to see innovation as a process, linear, manageable and, above all, controllable. Even those who write about science parks are beneficiaries in a sense [51] But there are also costs, costs that are generally overlooked in the general assumption of universal benefits [52] . High technology firms seem to gain little from their location on technology parks apart from enhanced status, which seems to be sought on science parks everywhere, including China [53] . Beyond that, there is nothing; even the basic agglomeration economies that high technology firms find so important in nature are devalued by the regulation of the science park [54] . If science parks fail to achieve their stated objectives, they impose an opportunity cost. Once again, the supposition that science parks work as they are said to work is based on unchallenged assumptions. to, the linear model." [57] The problem is that adoption of these other models might unsettle the existing system and threaten its beneficiaries. Hence the interest in reinforcing the Silicon Valley model, and in encouraging its diffusion. Science parks are touted round the world in defiance of the evidence and in deference to the myth [58] . And the more science parks created, the greater the precedent for more still to be created [59] .
"The UK science park phenomenon, itself drawing on an unrealistic interpretation of US post-war industrial history, is now being seen as a model for other countries, in southern and eastern Europe, and in the developing nations of the south." [60] It is, of course, quite pointless confronting myth with logic. It may be logical to assert, as Qian does in the Chinese context, that Silicon Valley cannot be re-created in the science park [61] . But it is also quite out of tune with the myth, and therefore an irrelevant observation. This paper has sought to explain the importance of myth in the understanding of science parks. What it has not done, and could not do, is challenge the myth. Beliefs are not altered by mere logic, in China or anywhere else.
"Science parks provide an ideal interface between university and industry, not only for developed countries, but also for developing countries. " [62] 
